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I. The Need for a Shin Buddhist Social Ethics
SOCIAL ethics does not refer to personal morality, but rather deals with the question of a person’s role in, and responsibility towards, social prob­
lems, and how one can best engage oneself in society in order to create a bet­
ter world. This was not a problem in the pre-modem age when society and 
the state were accepted as “given,” and when people were generally content 
with keeping their position in society as good subjects. It was only when the 
ideal of a nation state came into existence that social ethics became a topic of 
serious debate, as people were then able to participate in the creation of the 
nation and society as equal members of their country.
In Japan, social ethics became an important issue only in 1945 when, with 
her defeat in World War II, the imperial system collapsed and a new Con­
stitution, based on popular sovereignty, was adopted. In this sense, “social 
ethics” is a fairly new concept in Japan, which became an issue, first and 
foremost, at the level of the ordinary citizen, as it still is today, where active 
participation in political, economic, educational and environmental prob­
lems—all of which substantially affect daily life—was required as morals 
for citizenship.
Under such circumstances, why is it necessary to stress the need for a 
social ethics based on Shin Buddhism? As stated above, such ethics is a mat­
ter of individual concern with one’s relationship to society, and therefore, it 
may be argued that it is sufficient for a Shin Buddhist to participate in soci­
ety at the level of an ordinary citizen. However, it is important to note that
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behind this argument lies the notion that religion belongs to a transcendental 
realm beyond the affairs of this secular world, which must be considered 
carefully.
Therefore, I should like to suggest the following three reasons as an 
answer to the question above. First, Shin Buddhism, historically, has often 
been engaged in society in a misguided way. Second, religion presents a per­
spective which, by making all things in this world relative, serves to deepen 
and enrich civic social ethics. Third, there is a general misunderstanding of 
the central teaching of Other Power (tariki which has prevented the fol­
lowers from active participation in social matters.
First, the Shin Buddhist institutions actively supported the modem imper­
ial nation. Not only did Higashi and Nishi Honganji provide financial assis­
tance when the Meiji government was established, but they also sought to 
create, up to the time of Japan’s defeat in 1945, “loyal subjects” needed by 
the imperial government. Particularly during times of war, they took the lead 
in preaching that the duty of a Shin Buddhist was to die gloriously on the bat­
tlefield, and therefore urged the simple believers to march off to combat.1 
Furthermore, the abbots of both Honganjis took imperial princesses as their 
wives and thus established close ties with the imperial family, which further 
served to provide an important emotional support for the imperial system, 
especially as these abbots were regarded as living buddhas. Of course, in that 
age, Japan needed nationalism if she was to remain an independent country. 
During the early Meiji period (1868-1912), the Shin Buddhist institutions 
had suffered a severe blow from the anti-Buddhist persecution and therefore, 
it may be understandable that they became entangled with nationalism in 
order to re-establish themselves. However, the path they took led them far 
away from the Buddhist teachings, as in glorifying war to such an extent, 
they justified the slaughter of humanity in the name of compassion, the fun­
damental teaching of Buddhism. This was nothing more than casuistry. Even 
after the war, many priests and lay Buddhists still blamed everything on “the 
trend of the times” and so refused to confront their war responsibilities.1 2
1 Let me give one example from “Letter to a Soldier Going Off to the Front Lines” by
Akegarasu Haya (1877-1954): “Before you defeat the enemy country, you must defeat
the enemy in your heart: the voice that says ‘I want to return alive.’ You must consider this 
voice as the devil’s temptation.... Please fight courageously and when you return... come back 
as white bones.” (Akegarasu 1904)
2 Ichikawa Hakugen ffrjll (1902-1986) is one of the few Japanese Buddhists who have
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Therefore, how should we, who wish to live our lives on the basis of a Shin 
Buddhist faith, understand these past actions perpetrated in its very name? 
What, after all, is the basis of social action in Shin Buddhism? When we con­
sider these questions, those of us who follow such a faith cannot leave the 
question concerning social ethics unanswered.
Second, as religion transcends the secular realm, it provides us with a per­
spective from which everything in this world can be relativized, which 
makes it possible to perceive various contradictions and conflicts within 
society with sufficient objectivity. As a result, religion can serve to resolve 
these problems. A good example is the anti-war peace movement led by 
Vietnamese Buddhists during the Vietnam War. Though I do not wish to go 
into details here, suffice it to say that South Vietnam was turned into a bat­
tlefield as a result of ideological conflicts, and that Vietnamese Buddhists 
refused to support either of these ideological positions, and instead, took the 
sufferings of their fellow human beings upon themselves, treating their pain 
as their own. By devoting themselves single-heartedly to non-violence and 
the spirit of compassion, these Buddhists were able to work towards the end­
ing of the war, unlike the politicians.3
What is particularly important to note here is that, through their experi­
ence, these Vietnamese Buddhists expanded the idea of duhkha, the funda­
mental principle of Buddhism, to encompass not only personal suffering but 
also that which has its roots in the structure of society itself. In this way, they 
attempted to work actively towards the eradication of suffering which arises 
from social and political problems.4 This became the core idea of the social­
ly-engaged Buddhism that subsequently appeared in various parts of Asia, 
and marks the appearance of a “Buddhist social ethics” which is clearly dis­
tinct from that of a civic-oriented one.5
Among Japanese Buddhists also, before thinking about social ethics as 
just concerning citizens or a people of a particular country, there are growing 
attempts to ask how they, as Buddhists, can participate in society on the basis
consistently pursued the problem of war responsibilities of Japanese Buddhism and Japanese 
Buddhists since the end of the war in 1945. His works like The War Responsibilities of 
Japanese Buddhists (1970) and Japanese Religion under Fascism (1975) are important for 
Buddhist social ethics.
3 For details, see Thich Nhat Hanh 1967.
4Cf. Thich Nhat Hanh 1987.
5 On engaged Buddhism see, for example, Queen and King, eds. 1996. 
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of their own faith.6 In particular, since the 1960s, there has been a move 
towards democratization within Higashi Honganji (Shinshu Otani-ha) and as 
part of this attempt, there has arisen a need to define an image of an ideal 
society or form of social participation, based on the teaching of Shin 
Buddhism.7 The recognition that there is a pressing need to construct such a 
social ethic is spreading among Shin Buddhists.
6 As one such attempt, there is Ayus 7 —37, (The International Buddhist Association 
Network), a Japanese inter-denominational Buddhist NGO (non-governmental organization). 
URL: http://www.ayus.org/.
7 The Constitution of Shinshu Otani-ha gives the “actualization” and “realization” of a 
“society based on Buddhist fellowship” (ddbd shakai fffJWt^) as the denomination’s goal.
Let us now turn to the third reason why there is a necessity to address the 
issue of a Shin Buddhist social ethics. Among Shin priests and lay people, 
there is a particular reluctance to engage in social problems from the stand­
point of their faith. One reason for this may be traced back to the fact that the 
need for “social ethics” has not yet been fully accepted in Japanese society 
as a whole. However, I feel that the major reason seems to be the mistaken 
understanding of the characteristic of the Shin Buddhist doctrine of Other 
Power, which refers to the power of Amida Buddha’s Vow, guaranteeing the 
attainment of Buddhahood by ordinary beings. Unfortunately, reliance on 
Other Power has often been misunderstood to mean that one must refrain 
from active decision-making, even when confronted with the problems of 
daily life. The Shin teaching of entrusting oneself to Amida came to be 
understood, in practical terms, to “leave everything up to others” and hence, 
instead of working voluntarily to change the actual world, the ideal Shin 
Buddhist way of life was defined as accepting reality “as it is” and going 
along with the flow of events. This, however, is a mistaken understanding of 
Other Power, as even though this is essential in order for ordinary people to 
become buddhas, we must still do our best to live our daily lives to the 
utmost. That is what life is all about! The only thing that Other Power guar­
antees is the attainment of Buddhahood. It will not resolve the contradic­
tions, conflicts and discord in our daily life. Shin Buddhists often fail to see 
this, and as a result, they are prevented from looking squarely at social suf­
fering and so have remained unable to practice the compassion, required of 
all Buddhists. Therefore, in order to dispel this mistaken view, we need to 
clarify the significance of social ethics in Shin Buddhism.
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II. The Problem of the Two Truths
In the previous section, I pointed out that Shin Buddhism has a history of 
being closely allied to the state—one which was based on the divine right of 
the emperor. The ideological basis of this attitude towards the state was set 
forth in the doctrine of the Two Truths (shin-zoku nitai which,
when we think about Shin Buddhist social ethics, is necessay to consider 
first.
These Two Truths are Absolue Truth (sTimtaz) and Worldly Truth (zoku- 
tai). In Shin Buddhism, the former referred to its teaching of attaining 
Buddhahood by being bom in Amida Buddha’s Pure Land, while the latter 
was understood to refer to secular order and morality. However, these Two 
Truths were turned into a doctrine for regulating Shin Buddhists’ activities in 
society, which, simply put, required the followers to observe social order, 
cultivate social virtues and become people useful to the state—all in the 
name of Worldly Truth.
This doctrine developed from the principle that “the king’s law is funda­
mental (d/?o ihon preached by Rennyo ag® (1415-1499), the
eighth abbot of Honganji, who required his followers to respect this in order 
to protect them from the harsh persecution of the daimyo (feudal lords), 
although he still regarded faith (shinjin) as of primary concern.8
8 For example, in his Ofumi (Letters), Rennyo states as follows: “You should put priority 
on the king’s law and hide the Buddha’s law from sight. In society, you should put priority on 
benevolence, and refrain from slighting other Buddhist denominations. Moreover, you should 
not treat the gods rudely.” (Kasahara and Inoue, eds. 1972, p. 71)
Under the Tokugawa feudal system, it was not faith but loyalty to the 
political system that became the main requirement, and the doctrine of the 
Two Truths was used to inculcate an obedient dutiful way of life useful to the 
rulers. However, after the collapse of the shogunate in 1868, Buddhism was 
actively persecuted by the new Meiji government, and as we saw above, this 
crisis led the Buddhist institutions to adopt a very nationalistic stance. 
Through this process, this doctrine gradually became the dominant ideology, 
and eventually came to hold a central place in modem Shin Buddhist doctri­
nal system. For example, in the Temple Law of the Denomination (Shiisei 
jihd tkHOIS), compiled by both Higashi and Nishi Honganji as their 
supreme laws after the Meiji Restoration, it was declared to be their orthodox 
teaching.
39
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST XXXIII, 2
According to the temple law of Higashi Honganji, having faith in birth in 
the Pure Land was defined as the Gate of Absolute Truth. The law further 
stated that:
To revere the emperor, to observe the laws, to refrain from violat­
ing the rules of society, to refrain from causing discord in human 
relations, and by such means applying oneself diligently to one’s 
occupation and helping the nation prosper—this is the Gate of 
Worldly Truth.
Moreover, the two gates were said to support and augment each other.9
9 Shinshu Kydgaku Kenkyujo 1975, p. 131.
10 Honganji Shiryo Kenkyujo, ed. 1969, p. 181.
11 One section of the Imperial Rescript on Education reads as follows: “Should emergency 
arise, offer yourself courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of 
Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and 
faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.” (Translation 
taken from Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig 1965, p. 276.) The Rescript was issued in 1890. 
Nearly twenty years before that, in 1871, Konyo Ol, the then chief abbot of Nishi Honganji, 
stated as follows in his last testament (Ikun 1S8I|), “Everyone bom in the emperor’s land is
In Nishi Honganji, Absolute Truth was said to be “hearing the Buddha’s 
Name in faith, and repaying the (Buddha’s) great compassion in one’s 
mind,” while Worldly Truth was defined as “treading the human path and 
observing the king’s law.” Here once again, the two gates were said to sup­
port and augment each other.10 11
There are at least two problems with this doctrine. First, it rejects the 
supremacy of faith advocated by Honen (1133-1212), Shinran 
(1173-1262) and their followers, and instead gives priority to observing an 
ideology of morality which serves to uphold the state. Although both 
Absolute and Worldly Truths were said to support and augment each other, 
the relationship between the two was not explained sufficiently. The obser­
vance of secular morality proclaimed, for example, in the Imperial Rescript 
on Education (Worldly Truth), cannot be deduced from the act of uttering the 
nembutsu with faith in Amida Buddha’s Original Vow (Absolute Truth). Nor 
is there any necessary connection between the Shin Buddhist teaching and 
acting as loyal subjects. In spite of this, the Shin Buddhist institutions taught 
their believers the need to become loyal subjects, observing such ordinances 
as the Imperial Rescript on Education.11
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Second, there is the problem that Shin Buddhists exhibited little doubts 
about submitting themselves to the social order and secular morality with 
which they were confronted, let alone criticize them. While there were peo­
ple who benefited from maintaining the order, there were also many who 
were oppressed by it, or were unjustly deprived of their human rights under 
it. In other words, attempts to maintain or strengthen social order often tend 
to cover up the contradictions and injustices inherent within it, and the doc­
trine of the Two Truths assisted in such concealment.
Seen from another angle, it is clear that this doctrine did not arise natural­
ly from the fundamental teachings of Shin Buddhism, but was created in 
order to muster Shin believers, socially, in a systematic attempt to protect the 
Shin Buddhist institutions. Moreover, the widespread support of this doc­
trine by both Shin believers and people in general was made possible by the 
strong nationalistic sentiment in Japan during this time so that Shin 
Buddhism failed to protect its autonomy and hence, was swallowed up by 
nationalism.
III. The Basis of a Shin Buddhist Social Ethics
Let us carry our analysis a little bit further as there is a need to explain why 
it was possible for the doctrine of the Two Truths to develop in Shin 
Buddhism, and unless this point is clairified, it is possible that similar mis­
guided attempts to mobilize believers socially, in the name of Shin 
Buddhism, may recur in the future.
Paradoxically, the answer to the above question lies in the way the nem- 
butsu of the Original Vow was taught. As stated above, Honen only empha­
sized how ordinary beings could attain Buddhahood, without teaching the 
necessity of adopting a special set of morals distinctive to nembutsu practi­
tioners and hence, the way in which each of them led their life was left up to 
them. He states, “As for the way in which to lead your life, you should live it 
by reciting the nembutsu. You should abhor and reject all things that obstruct 
the nembutsu, and refrain from doing them.”12
indebted to the emperor.... Do not err concerning the teaching of the Two Truths. In this life, 
remain loyal to the emperor.” Fukuma, Sasaki and Hayashima eds.1983, pp. 197-98.
12 Honen, “Shonin densetsu no kotoba BtAfiBSOKl,” in Wago Toroku fiJBSJTSR (Writings 
in Japanese) vol. 5. Showa Shinsan kokuyaku daizokyo Jodoshu seiten
TASfift) Toho Shoin MTjWIS, 1928, p. 258.
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Why, then, did Honen refrain from teaching morals and a particular way 
of life to his followers? To put it briefly, it was because he understood 
humans as being inextricably bound by their “karmic conditions (gd-en B 
®).”13 Here “karma (go)” means “actions” while “conditions (<?n)” refer to 
their “indirect causes,” which humans have no way of completely knowing. 
While the cause-and-effect relationships that we can understand appear to us 
as inevitable, “conditions fen)” in these relationships can only be seen as 
“chance,” and such “chances” control human actions. Furthermore, the kar­
mic conditions of each person are different and therefore, even though every­
one may be required to follow a uniform way of life, it is impossible to do so 
in actuality. Even morality may be useless in some cases, as for example, a 
person who has been taught not to kill, and who in fact would not kill even 
an insect, would kill enemy soldiers when sent off to the battlefield. It is 
impossible to foretell what a person may do depending on their karmic con­
ditions, which is why Honen taught that we need to ultimately rely upon the 
nembutsu of the Original Vow. This is truly a penetrating insight into our 
karmic conditions.
13 Concerning the following discussion on karmic conditions, see Ama 1999.
However, it must be said that this insight was lacking in the doctrine of the 
Two Truths, in which there was no apprehending of sorrow where the world 
of religion becomes real to us only when we realize our ultimate moral 
inability. The doctrine was, for all practical purposes, just a moral theory, but 
was ironically forced upon a way of life which had been left up to each nem­
butsu practitioner since the time of Honen. As well as this, the ethos of sub­
mission to authority which had been fermenting since the Tokugawa period, 
made the people accept the doctrine uncritically, as it was set forth by the 
chief abbot himself.
In the teaching of the nembutsu of the Original Vow, as Honen had taught, 
the question of how to lead one’s life was left up to the judgement of each 
individual nembutsu practitioner and therefore, any attempt to create a new 
Shin Buddhist ethics must start from this point. Basically, each practitioner 
has to discover their own way to lead their life depending on their situation. 
At first sight, this may seem passive and vague, but actually it is a way of life 
in which priority is given to the autonomous decision-making power of each 
individual, which needs to be regained as it is the basis of, and the prerequi­
site for, any possible Shin Buddhist social ethics.
As stated above, under the imperial system, the Higashi Honganji institu-
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tion sought to muster its believers for nationalistic political purposes by 
using the doctrine of the Two Truths. Yet we must not forget that there was a 
person within its ranks who attempted to go beyond all this and tried, like 
Honen and Shinran, to uphold the supremacy of faith. Similarly, the institu­
tion also gave birth to a nembutsu practitioner who refused to ignore the suf­
ferings of his fellow believers and stood up fearlessly for the cause of social 
justice. Although both their activities were far outside the mainstream of 
Shin Buddhist history, the construction of a Shin Buddhist social ethic must 
begin by reviving their hopes and visions. These two people are Kiyozawa 
Manshi (1863-1903) and Takagi Kenmyo rftThiPJI (1864-1914)
and therefore, in the pages below, I should like to briefly discuss their under­
standing of ethical values in society.
IV. Kiyozawa Manshi and his Faith-centered Religion
Kiyozawa Manshi was a scholar who created, for the first time in Japan, an 
academic religious philosophy based on the study of western philosophers 
like Hegel. Also, as a priest in Higashi Honganji, he was influential both in 
modernizing its institution and in interpreting Shinran’s thought in a modem 
way.
Among Kiyozawa’s many achievements, the most noteworthy was the 
fact that he succeeded in going beyond the doctrine of the Two Truths. In his 
essay, “The Relationship between Religious Morality and Common 
Morality,” the last work he published before his death, he proclaims reli­
gious values to be absolute.14 According to Kiyozawa, the reason why 
Worldly Truth is preached alongside Absolute Truth in Shin Buddhism is to 
demonstrate to nembutsu practitioners how difficult it is to lead a life in 
accordance with secular morality (that is to say, Worldly Truth). For this rea­
son, even while emphasizing this Truth, it only spoke of the “king’s law and 
benevolence,” or “humanity, justice, courtesy, wisdom and sincerity” or 
secular “codes,” without going into details about what each signified. In 
other words, for those whose minds had not yet settled in faith, Worldly 
Truth was taught in order to lead them to “religion” by making them realize 
their inability to live a moral life. Similarly, for those who had already 
attained unwavering faith, the same Truth served to make them realize even 
more acutely the impossibility of living a moral life and thereby allowing 
them to rejoice all the more in having attained faith in the Other Power.
14 This article is found in Kiyozawa 1903. For an English translation, see Blum tr. 1989.
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To sum up, for Kiyozawa, the doctrine of the Two Truths serves merely to 
demonstrate the following points: (1) that, once one has attained faith, there 
is no need to be dismayed even if one cannot live morally and (2) that, once 
one realizes that one cannot live a moral life, one becomes even more grate­
ful for having attained faith (in Amida Buddha, who specifically promises to 
save even the most degenerate human being). Therefore, Kiyozawa argues 
that, even though one may have to cast morality aside in order to lead one’s 
life in faith, it cannot be helped. This statement, which signifies his aban­
donment of morality, shows his success in stating that religious values are 
absolute. It is identical, in content, to the proclamation made by Honen and 
Shinran in the 13th century, concerning the supremacy of the nembutsu of 
the Original Vow.
As mentioned before, this essay was published in 1903. We may add that 
the Imperial Rescript on Education had already been promulgated in 1890 
and that greater stress was being placed on the inculcation of the need to 
become good subjects of the emperor by leading moral lives. When we 
understand the historical context, we can see how critical Kiyozawa was of 
the Japanese society of his time:
... the Shinshu worldly truth teaching is not something which sets 
out to impose prescriptions on human behavior. . . . For that reason 
it is a great misperception to think the worldly truth teaching exists 
in order to compel people to uphold standards of human behavior 
or by extension to benefit society and the nation. If the worldly 
truth teaching were expounded in connection with the laws of the 
king or the precepts of benevolence and humanity, as a matter of 
course it would be conducive to the performance of [these duties] 
to some degree. In fact [such concerns] are an appendant phenom­
enon. The essential point of the teaching is to show that one is 
unable to carry out [these duties], . . . Despite the fact that the es­
sential thrust of the doctrine is religious, it is its appended moral 
elements that seem to be valued most highly; a strange set of 
circumstances indeed!15
15 Blum tr. 1989, pp. 106-108, slightly modified.
In this way, Kiyozawa politely consigned the orthodox Shin Buddhist doc­
trine of the Two Truths to oblivion.
Several years earlier in 1892, he attempted to construct the foundations of 
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a Shin Buddhist social ethics in his Skeleton of a Philosophy of Religion, 
where he defines religion as a faculty, found within finite human beings, 
which seeks for the Infinite. Furthermore, Kiyozawa distinguishes two ways 
in which the finite can attain to the Infinite. The first is the method of devel­
oping the Infinite which resides within the finite, while the second is through 
the Infinite reaching out and embracing the finite and bringing it into itself. 
Kiyozawa called the former the “Self-exertion Gate” and the latter the 
“Other-power Gate.”
I should like to note the following point that Kiyozawa makes here. In the 
Other-power Gate, as the difference between the finite and the Infinite 
becomes apparent, not only do people revere the Infinite, but they also show 
greater concern for the ethical relationships among finite beings themselves, 
and as a result, strive to put into practice the “right path of the human world 
(Jinsei no seidd AifiOlEjl).” As he says:
(In the Other-power Gate), when one attains the Settled Mind 
(anjin ST?), the distinction between the finite and the Infinite 
becomes vividly clear. It becomes truly clear that the finite exists 
within the realm of the Infinite. At that point, one realizes for the 
first time that the finite is truly finite. For this reason one appre­
hends, on the one hand, one’s religious connection to the Infinite, 
and, on the other hand, one’s moral connection with other finite 
beings, and recognizes the distinction between so-called “reli­
gion” and “morality.” One then comes to exert oneself in the prac­
tice of the right path of the human world in the ethical realm.16 17
16 Kiyozawa 1892, p. 100.
17 An English translation of the Skeleton was prepared by Noguchi Zenshiro If □ S E36|5 on 
the occasion of the World Parliament of Religion held in Chicago in 1893. See Kiyozawa 
1893. As Kiyozawa himself apparently made numerous corrections to Noguchi’s draft trans­
lation, the English translation can be seen as reflecting Kiyozawa’s views quite faithfully. The 
translation “the progress and improvement of the world” is found on p.75.
The distinction between religion and morality is clearly recognized for the 
first time when one gains faith in the Other-power Gate, and as a result, the 
freedom to put the “right path of the human world” into practice without fear 
or anxiety about the consequences. This must be the starting point of the 
social ethics we are considering here. It may be noted that the term “right 
path of the human world” is rendered as “the progress and improvement of 
the world” in the English translation of the Skeleton)'’ Although the term 
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“social ethics” is not used here, this rendering clearly indicates the nature 
and direction of social engagement based on a Shin Buddhist faith, which 
becomes even clearer when considering how Kiyozawa himself subsequent­
ly participated actively in the movement to reform the Higashi Honganji 
institution.18
18 On the relationship between the movement to reform Higashi Honganji and the develop­
ment of Kiyozawa’s thought, see Moriya 1996.
19 Kiyozawa 1896.
For example, in his essay entitled “The Present Benefits of Buddhism” 
published in 1896, he writes that finite beings, even while remaining in the 
finite state, can apply themselves in the world “actively and vigorously.”19 
Furthermore, he unequivocally states that an active and vigorous life is a 
“great source of welfare in the human world” and that only those who have 
faith in the Other-power Gate are able to devote themselves wholeheartedly 
to it.
Kiyozawa’s movement to reform Higashi Honganji was forced to disband 
soon after it created a nationwide organization. One may say it was a setback 
and defeat, but from Kiyozawa’s point of view, it provided an opportunity to 
appeal for the necessity of reform beyond the boundary of Higashi Honganji 
and to society as a whole, which was a development and enrichment of the 
social ethics of Other-power Buddhism. This is clearly indicated in the edi­
torial placed at the beginning of Issue 14 of the journal, Kydkai jigen 
W (Timely Words for the Buddhist World), which Kiyozawa published with 
his colleagues in the reform movement. Here, he went beyond calling for the 
reform of Higashi Honganji, and proclaimed his intention to embark on such 
a movement encompassing all of Japanese society.
To begin with, to reform the administration of Otani-ha [i.e. 
Higashi Honganji] is not our only goal. As ordinary Buddhists, we 
wish to engage in discussion worthy of Buddhists. As ordinary 
men of religion, we wish to set forth views worthy of such people. 
As ordinary citizens, we wish to set forth intentions worthy of cit­
izens and serve to promote the culture of the Japanese empire. We 
have already proclaimed this in the first issue of this journal. In the 
ten-odd months since we began publication, the situation, both 
within and outside Higashi Honganji, has undergone rapid change. 
It is now impossible to limit our journal solely to matters pertain­
ing to the reform of its administration. Therefore, from this issue 
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on, the Kydkai jigen will work for the reform of the Buddhist world 
in general along with that of the Otani-ha administration. As well 
as this, we shall call for improvements in the political, legal, edu­
cational and academic realms, and we hope that, while doing this, 
we shall not be remiss in reviewing anything connected with reli- 
20gion.
In the subsequent issue of Kydkcii jigen, Kiyozawa published an essay titled 
“Buddhists, Why Do You Lack Self-Esteem?”20 1 in which he emphasized 
that a Buddhist must simultaneously live in two worlds, namely the religious 
and the secular. Religious people tend to concentrate on giving themselves 
up to the transcendent world beyond daily life. However important though 
this might be, they must not forget the existence of the everyday world—a 
world of human relationships dominated by “unmistakable distinctions of 
self and others, intimate and distant relationships.” Kiyozawa argues that, 
being confronted with such a world, religious people need to involve them­
selves in it in a practical way, and stresses the necessity of living resolutely 




Towards the end of his life, Kiyozawa gave the name seishin shngi 
it (literally “spirit-ism”) to this way of life which stressed, above all, the 
need to estabish one’s life on a “perfectly firm ground,” sustained by the 
Absolute/Infinite.22
Kiyozawa further explains this way of life as the “logical path by which 
the ‘spirit’ (seishin, or the Other-power faith) develops,” which cannot be 
ignored when thinking about a Shin Buddhist social ethics. According to this 
passage, the seishin develops throughout life in stages, a process that can be 
clearly seen. Kiyozawa, above all, emphasized doing this by establishing 
oneself in the Other Power in the everyday world which is, to repeat his 
words above, dominated by “unmistakable distinctions of self and others, 
intimate and distant relationships.” He did not consider faith as just having 
peace within one’s own mind which merely keeps oneself locked up in a 
narrow, fixed world, but rather spiritual awareness only comes alive in 
“practical actions (Jikkd ^Tf)” based on Other-power faith, which must also 
include social ethics.
Then, of what does such a social ethics consist? Though Kiyozawa has 
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already provided us with several suggestions, it was Takagi Kenmyo who 
actually put them into practice.
V. The Social Ethics of Takagi Kenmyo
As is well known, the Meiji Constitution contained a clause which stated that 
the emperor was “sacred and inviolable” and in order to back up such a 
claim, the government incorporated the crime of High Treason (taigyaku-zai 
into the criminal law in 1908, which held that anyone who harmed, or 
attempted to harm, the emperor or his direct descendents would be put to 
death. It just so happened that in May 1910, some workers in a lumber mill 
in Nagano prefecture were arrested for the illegal possession of explosives. 
In the course of interrogation, it was discovered that they had been planning 
to assassinate the emperor, and because of this, they were tried for the above 
crime. Yamagata Aritomo, who held the reins of government in those days, 
decided to use this opportunity to eradicate socialists and anarchists whose 
influence had been growing in Japanese society. The prosecution concocted 
a story about their plotting to assassinate the emperor with the prominent 
socialist Kotoku Shusui (1871-1911) as their ringleader. This gov­
ernment fabrication became known as the “High Treason Incident,”23 24in 
which Takagi Kenmyo was implicated.
23 Wagatsuma 1969 is a useful reference for understanding the general outline of the “High 
Treason Incident.” On its relationship to Buddhism, see Ama 1994.
24 See Appendix.
Takagi, himself, was bom on May 21, 1864, as the son of a confectioner 
in Aichi prefecture, and after graduating from a school in Nagoya belonging 
to Higashi Honganji, he became a priest. In 1897, he was sent to Josenji 
tF in Wakayama prefecture, and two years later became its head priest. Many 
of the members of this temple lived in hisabetsu buraku (socially
discriminated communities), and suffered from poverty and discrimination. 
Deeply moved by their plight, Takagi became a leader of their liberation 
movement. He also worked actively for the abolition of state prostitution, 
and bitterly opposed the Russo-Japanese War when it broke out. As can be 
clearly seen from his essay entitled “My Socialism (To ga Shakaishugi 
Takagi’s actions were a form of social practice based on his 
Shin Buddhist faith. However, because he was on close terms with the 
socialists, he was unfortunately drawn into this “High Treason Incident.”
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For this reason, on January 18, 1911, Takagi was sentenced to death along 
with twenty-three other people. Among them, twelve were actually put to 
death, while the rest, including Takagi, had their sentences commuted to life 
imprisonment. He was sent to a prison in Akita prefecture, where he hanged 
himself on June 24, 1914, at the age of 51. Shinshu Otani-ha (Higashi 
Honganji) defrocked Takagi on the very day of his sentencing. However, 
with the spread of the Dobokai movement Association of Fellow
Believers) within the denomination in the 1960s, Takagi’s importance was 
re-evaluated and finally, on April 1, 1996, the denomination officially 
reversed their previous decision, and thereafter he was fully reinstated.25 
Higashi Honganji not only restored Takagi but also declared it would do its 
utmost to carry on his work, which bodes well for the future of Shin 
Buddhism, since an important guiding principle for its ethics is clearly 
revealed in Takagi’s deeds.
25 I must add here that the re-evaluation of Takagi’s deeds and official reinstatement are due 
largely to the research of Prof. Izumi Shigeki SBJ® of Otani University, who has put much 
effort into rediscovering Takagi’s life and work for the present generation. Prof. Izumi’s pub­
lished works are listed in the bibliography below.
Basically, Shin Buddhist social ethics is not anything that can be 
expressed through general plans or slogans, but rather something that those 
who have attained shinjin will undertake, based on their own decision in 
accordance with the particular circumstances in which they find themselves. 
As noted above, each human being is distinct as each carries karmic condi­
tions peculiar to that particular person and therefore, they cannot be lumped 
together, as it were, and treated as if they are all the same. However, should 
there be a common element in Shin Buddhist social ethics, it is that it accords 
with Amida Buddha’s compassion. In this respect, Takagi practiced compas­
sion with a pure heart.
In “My Socialism,” he relates how he attained peace and happiness upon 
receiving Amida Buddha’s compassion, whereupon his life was completely 
transformed, enabling him to abide in the desire to “do what the Buddha 
wishes me to do, to practice what he wishes me to practice, and make the 
Buddha’s will my own will.” The Other-power faith transformed all of his 
previous thoughts and prompted in him “great determination.” In this way, 
Takagi “opened himself up (tainin to Amida Buddha’s mind of com­
passion, and became very determined to put it into practice, which he did by 
embarking on a movement to bring about “progress (kojd shinpo 
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and “community (kyddo seikatsu #|W]d=iS),” sustained by “compassion 
directed equally towards everyone.” In Takagi’s words, our desire is neither 
to receive medals nor to become generals or nobles. We wish to bring about 
“progress” and “community” through energy and labor sustained by faith.26
26 See Appendix, p. 59 below.
27 Although I was not able to treat him in this paper due to the limitation of space, Imamura 
Yemyo AH8TE (1867-1932), the second chief missionary of the Honpa Hongwanji (com­
monly known as Nishi Honganji) also worked to incorporate compassion into laws and insti­
tutions. He is an important example of a person who practiced Shin Buddhist social ethics. 
Imamura lived around the same time as Kiyozawa and Takagi, and for this reason, too, his 
work needs to be considered in detail. On Imamura’s work, see Moriya 1999, Moriya 2000, 
and Moriya 2001.
Then, what exactly are “progress” and “community”? The former consists 
of realizing peace through thoroughgoing opposition to war and elimination 
of social inequality and discrimination, while the latter refers to life free from 
the “struggle for existence,” where labor is used only for producing suste­
nance so that the cultivation of one’s spiritual life can be actualized without 
any problems. What Takagi expressed is profound, all the more so as he stat­
ed what he believed simply. What is worthy of being called “progress” and 
“community” still remain weighty questions, even after passing through the 
dark history of the modern world. What choices should we, who lead our 
lives on the basis of Other-power faith, make in order to bring about these 
two ideals? This is indeed the problem of a modern Shin Buddhist social 
ethics.
Conclusion
Seen in this way, it can be said that both Kiyozawa Manshi and Takagi 
Kenmyo unflinchingly directed their gaze on the problems of modernity and 
sought to express compassion, the life-force of Buddhism, in new forms. As 
their examples illustrate, compassion in modem society cannot simply 
remain a personal virtue, but rather, it needs to become the guiding principle 
within laws and institutions to be truly effective.27
Whether an individual can be compassionate or not depends on circum­
stances; some people may become so upon gaining sAznjzn, while others may 
remain selfish as before. It basically depends upon that individual’s karmic 
conditions. However, to repeat the point again, it is inevitable in this modem 
world that a person’s life is profoundly affected by laws and institutions and 
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therefore, compassion, too, must not be limited to being merely a personal 
virtue but rather become a potent force for transforming society. It may take 
various forms, but Takagi’s goals of “progress” and “community” provide 
us with important guidelines when thinking about any Shin Buddhist social 
ethics.
As long as Buddhism is a religion of compassion, I believe that there can 
be no such thing as Shin Buddhist faith indifferent towards what is happen­
ing in the actual world. Faith, sustained by compassion, is naturally sensitive 
to the contradictions and absurdities in contemporary society and hence, by 
placing greater importance on the cultivation of such sensibilities, we shall 
surely be able to enrich this Other-power faith.
(Translated by Robert F. Rhodes)
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